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Prefatory note: Both of us have been involved in various aspects of economic reform in 
Tanzania and Vietnam. Brian, a British economist, first worked in Tanzania in the mid-1960, and 
has worked there, on and off, since 1981 on various aspects of economic policy, and since 1989 
has also been involved in Vietnam, on average spending about three months a year there. Dinh, 
a Vietnamese economist, has been involved in Tanzania during the past two years under the 
Project on Globalisation and East Africa. From time to time we are asked in Tanzania about the 
reasons for Vietnam’s apparent success (a matter of some immediate concern, given the impact 
of the extraordinary expansion of Vietnamese coffee exports on the world coffee market). We 
have often attempted informal responses; the purpose of this commentary is to see if we can 
address the comparative experience of Vietnam and Tanzania a little more systematically. These 
comments discuss both the impact of policies on economic performance, and the impact of 
economic experience on policy formulation in the two countries.   
Abstract: 
The economic reforms in Tanzania and Vietnam represent the two typical cases of transition 
economies in Asia and Africa, particularrly the transformation of the two developing economies 
from the planned to the market mechanism. In this paper, the two authors, Brian - a British 
economist and Dinh - a Vietnamese economist,  have, basing on a comparative approach, 
enquired into various economic and social aspects of the economic reforms in the two countries, 
including the demographic transition, the change in population growth, the investment in human 
capital, the growth of GDP, the structural sransformation, the linkage between gricultural 
growth, rural development, food production and poverty alleviation, the reform in the industrial 
sector and the state enterprises, the change of ownership , the role of the State, the capital 
formation, the role of the domestic savings, foreign aid, investment and trade, the gains and 
losses from globalisation, with an aim to find the answer to the question why in the two cases, 
Tanzania seemed to follow the donors’ guidance better than Vietnam, but achieved smaller 
successes? 
 
 
Keywords: Reform vesus Renovation; Fast Liberalisation vs Step-by-Step Transformation; 
Privatisation vs Equitisation; Multi-Sector Ownership vs Private Ownership Bias; 
Industrialisation vs Agriculture-Driven Growth; Active State vs Passive State. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the paper is to explore the lessons that emerge from comparison of the 
Vietnamese and Tanzanian experiences with economic reform. 
 
The timing of the reforms in Vietnam and Tanzania was quite close. Tanzania began to discuss 
reform and made the first moves towards reform in the early 1980’s, and put in place an explicit 
reform program in 1985, and has continued the process since. Vietnam made first tentative steps 
in the mid-1980’s, and began vigorous implementation of new policies from 1989 onwards. In 
both countries, reform programs continue.  
 
At the beginning of the reform process, the two economies had some similarities: while Vietnam 
is more populous (with more than twice the population of Tanzania), its GDP per capita was at a 
similar level to that of Tanzania at the end of the 1980’s, and it had a similar level of 
urbanisation. Both countries had, in principle, a high degree of government economic control 
before initiating reform. Therefore there is a plausible enough basis for comparison.   
One point of difference was that Vietnam was member of the CMEA (the old socialist trading 
system, involving the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European members of the former 
Soviet bloc) as well as being a less developed economy – these comments also therefore offer 
some points of comparison with other reforming ex-CMEA economies as well as with other 
developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1:  Population and Education
1 (Data is for 2002 unless otherwise stated) 
  Viet Nam  Tanzania 
Population       
 Population – millions  80  34.6 
 Pop. Density (people per squ. K.)  238  39 
 Crude birth rate (per 1,000-1999)  20  40 
 Crude death rate (per 1,000-1999)  6  17 
 Pop. Growth rate (1980-99) %  1.9  3 
Education    
 Adult Illiteracy – male >15 (1999)  5  16 
 Adult Illiteracy – female > 15 (1999)  9  34 
 Secondary enrolment % (1997)  57  6 
Tertiary enrolment % (1997)  7  1 
 
In comparing economic performance, all the indicators suggest that Vietnam has been 
significantly more successful than Tanzania. This is particularly reflected in the very high rates 
of export growth achieved by Vietnam, based on fast output growth in agriculture and industry.  
2 
 
Although the Tanzanian economy has responded positively to reform, and Tanzania is currently 
seen as one of the more successful reforming African economies, it has by no means yet been 
billed as a star performer. Performance in terms of growth – both the level of growth and 
acceleration compared with earlier years of crisis – and poverty alleviation have been less 
dramatic than in the case of Vietnam.  
 
During the 1990’s Vietnam enjoyed a very high growth rate and a remarkable reduction in 
poverty, both in comparison to developing countries at a similar income level and to other 
transitional economies (with the exception of China). Deep changes in the economic system were 
implemented without a decline in economic activity, the economy growing despite the sudden 
collapse of Soviet aid, the U.S. boycott and the absence of financial assistance from the 
                                                 
1   Sources for this and other tables are: World Development Indicators 2001, World Development Report 1990, 
(both World Bank); UN-Govt. of Viet Nam: Report on the Economy of Viet Nam, 1989; Vietnam Statistical 
Yearbook 1994, Statistical Publishing House; Tanzania 2002 Population Census, ESRF Quarterly Economic 
Review, Jan.-Mar. 2003. 
2 For an overview of the Vietnamese reform process and economic performance see Brian Van Arkadie and Raymond Mallon Vietnam: A Transition 
Tiger?  (2003)  
multilateral aid institutions before 1993. The success of Vietnam in that period contrasted with 
the deep contraction which generally accompanied reform in the other CMEA economies. 
 
Tanzania has had some success in stabilizing the economy and has generated a modest level of 
growth in per capita incomes. However, it has remained heavily dependent on external assistance 
and has not yet achieved the buoyant and diversified export growth of the kind that has powered 
the Vietnamese performance.  
 
From the point of view of reform-mongers, it would be neat if it could be demonstrated that 
Vietnam’s success resulted from more vigorous implementation of reform than in Tanzania. 
However, this does not jump out as a conclusion from the revue of experience.  
 
In some areas, Vietnam has been less energetic in implementing donor-promoted reforms than 
Tanzania. In donor tutorials, euphemistically entitled “policy dialogue”, there have been areas of 
persistent nagging, where donors have felt that the Vietnamese policy regime has had failings. 
The most persistent areas of criticism have related to the reform of State Enterprises and the 
regulatory environment for foreign investment. More recently, issues of governance and 
corruption have received increased emphasis.  
 
By and large, the record suggests that the often predicted dire consequences of failure to reform 
more vigorously in such directions have not materialised, suggesting that some parts of the donor 
reform agenda may be less relevant that proponents claim.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2:  GDP Growth 
  1987  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003
(a) 
GDP growth rates (%):           
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
3.4 
4.4
(b) 
2.3 
6.2 
9.5 
3.6 
6.7 
4.9 
6.84 
5.7 
7.04 
6.2 
7-7.5 
6.3 
GDP per capita (US$):           
Vietnam  
Tanzania
 (c)   
- 
- 
150 
189 
- 
272
 (d) 
- 
285 
416 
288 
- 
289
(e) 
 
(a) Projected. 
(b) 1988. 
(c) At current prices. 
(d) 1998. 
(e) Provisional data. 
 
 
2.0  THE IMPACT OF EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
 
A key question for economists faced with this difference in performance is how far is it to be 
explained by differences in economic policy? 
 
The heart of the problem of interpreting the impact of policy lies in the separation of the policy 
effects from the influence of factors exogenous to the policy framework. Even if there is a 
convincing case to be made for particular policy interventions, their impact may be mediated by 
the exogenous environment. One consequence is that the experience may not be readily 
transferable to a different context. 
 
Powerful exogenous factors that supported the expansion of the Vietnamese economy included 
its regional location and the trajectory of the regional economy, the timing of natural resource 
(oil) exploitation, the entrepreneurial vitality of the Vietnamese, a sizeable and dynamic emigrant 
community, and the onset of peace. Yet the acceleration of growth also began with strongly 
negative exogenous factors, such as the economic consequences of the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the CMEA and the effects of the US embargo.   
 
Mineral wealth can also be seen as an exogenous factor, although successful exploitation and the 
impact of increased revenues depend on policy.  
 
The development of Viet Nam’s oil resources contributed to rapid export growth during the late 
1980s and 1990s. In particular, oil revenues came on stream at a critical moment in the transition 
when Soviet support was faltering. New oil and gas resources continue to be found, and will be 
significant contributors to economic growth and budget revenue for at least the medium term, but 
not in such quantities as to generate a “Dutch disease” effect.  
 
Tanzania has begun to enjoy the effects of a mineral boom later in its reform process, with the 
gold boom that is currently gathering momentum. With the weak performance in other exports, 
gold and precious stones is now the leading export growth area, and is fast becoming the 
dominant component in export trade. This export growth is likely to enliven the Tanzanian 
growth performance, but also carries a risk of “Dutch disease” infection.  
 
Geographical location is of obvious significance for the comparison. Vietnam is adjacent to the 
region which was in the midst of a sustained boom (until the crisis of 1997). There was a spill-
over of capital and entrepreneurial energy from dynamic neighbours. Moreover, international 
investors were on the look-out for new Asian Tigers.  
By comparison, even an optimal policy regime in Africa is likely to be faced with investor 
scepticism in light of negative perceptions of the region. This may be changing, as with the end 
of apartheid, links have been created with the South African economy, so that Tanzania has 
begun to be critically influenced by the strong linkages developing with the South African 
economy.   
 
Another set of issues relates to the nature of the inheritance from the pre-reform period. The 
introduction of the Doi Moi reforms began in the second half of the 1980’s, and the acceleration 
in growth began in the early 1990’s, suggesting a strong causal relationship. However, that 
leaves open the issue of how far were the foundations of the Vietnamese performance laid in the 
pre-reform period. Should aspects of policy in the pre-Doi Moi be interpreted as important inputs  
into the later successes, or should that period be seen simply as an era of mistaken policy, that 
failed to realise inherent potential and held back the achievement of growth? If important 
building blocks of later success were laid in the pre-Doi Moi period, in what particular respects 
did pre-reform Vietnam differ from pre-reform Tanzania? 
 
 
3.0 TWO  CRUCIAL  DIFFERENCES IN THE PRE-REFORM 
ECONOMIES 
 
Two areas in which characteristics of the pre-reform economies contributed to the overall 
differences in performance relate to investment in human capital and the related factor of 
demographic transition. 
 
3.1   Investment in Human Capital  
 
One area in which Viet Nam had a clear lead over Tanzania in the pre-reform period was in 
relation to investment in human capital. By the late 1980’s, the population was better educated, 
and had a longer life expectancy, than is typical of countries with similar average per capita 
incomes, including Tanzania. 
 
A strong commitment to investment in human capital in Vietnam included a comprehensive 
basic education program, resulting in very high levels of literacy in rural as well as urban areas, 
and for women as well as men. It made Vietnam into a society with widespread adult literacy. By 
the mid-1970’s, Tanzania had made a similar commitment, when it introduced universal primary 
education. However, in the Tanzanian case, the onset of economic crisis at the end of the 1970’s 
resulted in a setback in the educational program, so that after a brief period of universal 
coverage, enrolments declined. As a result, by 2000 Tanzania still had an adult illiteracy rate of 
25%, whereas in Viet Nam it had been brought down to 7%.
3 
 
In Viet Nam, there was also a good deal of effort in technical and professional training, that 
involved active utilisation of opportunities for technical training abroad, as well as development 
                                                 
3   World Development Report, 2003.  
of national technical training capacity. This had begun even in the early stages of independence 
struggle.
4  
 
By comparison, when Tanzania began to pursue ambitious industrialisation goals in the mid-
1970’s its technical and professional cadres were still pitifully small (Tanzania had come to 
independence with a tiny educated elite, even by comparative regional standards).
5 
 
Vietnam was successful in developing and utilising a robust capability in intermediate 
technology, constructing buildings and other physical facilities and producing goods for the 
domestic market cheaply and of appropriate standard for a low income market, while more 
recently beginning to adapt its technology to the more demanding standards required for export 
markets. Investment in human capital paid off in terms of the receptivity to technical change and 
the economic opportunities emerging in the reform period. Effective delivery of education and 
health care have also contributed to the speedy demographic transition. 
 
3.2   Demographic Transition  
 
At the outset of the Doi Moi process, Viet Nam had a demographic advantage, as its 
demographic transition was more advanced than is typical of countries at comparable income 
levels A strong commitment to basic health care, including child health, resulted in much better 
statistics for mortality and life expectancy than are usually found in a country with such a low 
per capita income level. 
 
The 1989 population census indicated that fertility rates had declined for some decades. The 
crude birth rate (CBR) decreased from 45 per thousand (1955-59) to 31 per thousand (1985-89). 
A further decline from 30.1 in 1988-89 to 19.9 was reported in the 1999 Census.
6 Declining 
fertility reflects a widespread adoption of family planning. Thus by 1989, the population growth 
rate was characteristic of the middle stage of demographic transition, with mortality rates having 
                                                 
 
4   Vu Tat Boi, now retired in his mid-70’s. tells the story of walking to China with about 100 other youths in the early 1950’s 
to receive a technical training which led him to become a manager of a State Enterprise in mid-career. 
 
5   See the World Bank report on Tanganyika just prior to independence, The Economy of Tanganyika. 
6   Statistical Data of Vietnam Socio-Economy 1975-2000   Statistical Publishing House, General Statistical Office, 2000.  
fallen to low levels, and fertility rates beginning to decline. The inter-censal population growth 
rate (1979-1989) was estimated to be 2.1% per annum. The 1999 Census revealed an annual 
inter-censal growth rate of 1.7 % (1989-1999), with a continuing fall through the past decade, to 
an 1.4% estimated in 1999
7.  
 
By comparison, although Tanzania made a strong commitment in principle to basic health care 
and preventative medicine, and in the 1970’s was an African pioneer in developing such a 
strategy, the achievement fell far short of the program goals. One result is that Tanzania is still at 
a much earlier stage of demographic transition. The population growth rate remains at 2.8/2.9%. 
Life expectancy at birth is estimated at 44 (compared to 69 in Vietnam), with an under-5 
mortality rate of 149 per thousand (34 in Vietnam). The fertility rate is 5.6 children per woman 
(2.3 in Vietnam). 
 
In Vietnam there has been a clear transition in the age profile of the population. At the 1989 
Census the profile was a pyramid, with each five year cohort larger than the next older group.
8 
By 1999, this profile had changed in a crucial fashion, with a 5-9 year old cohort smaller than the 
10-14 group, and the 0-4 cohort showing an even sharper drop in size. In Tanzania, by contrast, 
it is estimated that 47% of the population is still below 15 years of age.
9  
 
In Viet Nam, the government has had an active population policy, discouraging families of more 
than two children, but without any draconian controls. The decline in the birth rate also reflected 
the success of health policies that reduced infant mortality, and the achievement of high 
educational enrolments. As a result of the demographic transition, Viet Nam is now experiencing 
a virtuous circle, in which a declining population growth rate is making it easier to achieve 
increases in per capita income, which in turn is associated with a further decline in birth rates. In 
Tanzania, the government has not pursued an active population policy. 
                                                 
 
7   The 1999 Population Census indicated a crude birth rate of 19.9 per thousand (compared to 30.1 in 1989) and a crude 
death rate of 5.6 per thousand (compared to 8.0 in 1989). 
8   Except for the male groups who were 45-54 at that time, which had been severely depleted by war deaths. 
 
9    The Economic Survey 2001; results of the 2002 Population Census are just becoming available, but are not 
incorporated in this essay.  
4.0  DIFFERENCES IN PERFORMANCE IN THE PRODUCTIVE 
SECTORS 
 
4.1   The Rural Sector and Agricultural Growth  
 
In 1990, of the estimated 66 million population in Vietnam, only 19.5% (12.9 million) were 
estimated to reside in urban areas. At the beginning of the 1990’s, Viet Nam’s economic 
structure, like Tanzania’s, was characteristic of a low income developing economy. Of the total 
estimated Vietnamese active labour force in 1992 of 31.8 million, 23.0 million (72%) were 
engaged in agriculture and little more than one tenth in industry. In 1990, agriculture and 
fisheries still accounted for two fifths (39%) of GDP. Even by 1999 (according to the April 1999 
Population and Housing Census) only 24% of the 76.6 million population was recorded as living 
in urban areas, a ratio that had only changed slowly over the previous decade.  
 
The Vietnamese experience confirms the importance of agricultural transformation as a 
component of successful growth in a low income country with a predominantly rural population. 
This is, of course, not in any sense an original or surprising conclusion. However, are there also 
lessons to be learnt about how transformation is to be achieved? 
 
In both Viet Nam and Tanzania, the rural nature of the economy and the dominant role of 
household units in agriculture production, meant that although the economies were technically 
not very advanced, they demonstrated resilience in the face of change and dislocation in the 
macro-economy and responded well to market opportunities.  
 
In Viet Nam, in early 1980’s, it proved relatively easy to reform and shift the agricultural system 
in the direction of market oriented family based farming. Moreover, a decentralized rural 
economy provided a useful base for the development of small-scale trading and craft activities, 
the local arteries of an emerging market system.  
 
In Tanzania, despite the diversion of Ujamaa, the production system had remained based on the 
household, so that the two systems are not dissimilar in terms of the importance of the small 
family farm. What had set back Tanzanian agriculture in the pre-reform period was the  
dislocation of the trading system, and the farming system responded swiftly to the opportunities 
provided through the liberalisation of trade, particularly in relation to food crops. 
 
 
 
In both countries, the liberalisation of agricultural export trade has been relatively slow and 
ambiguous, but the system seems to have performed better in Viet Nam, partly a manifestation of 
the more effective operation of State enterprise in Viet Nam, discussed below. 
 
A key question concerns the greater success of Viet Nam in generating accelerated growth in 
agricultural productivity. At first sight the overall data do not suggest the difference is that 
dramatic: agricultural productivity as measured in value added per agricultural worker increased 
from (1995) US$179 in 1988/90 to $189 in 1998/2000 in Tanzania, and from $181 to $240 over 
the same period in Viet Nam.
10 However, although this difference does not appear so great in 
absolute terms, it resulted in an enormous difference in the growth of the exportable surplus from 
agriculture.
11 The result in the case of Viet Nam, was the movement from being on the edge of 
famine, to becoming one of the three leading exporters of rice, and its extraordinary emergence 
as a leading coffee exporter.  
 
Tanzanian agriculture has not done badly in comparative regional terms – food production has 
grown along with population, the country has not experienced food supply crises in recent years, 
although it still has to import large quantities in years when the rains are poor,  and there has 
been some export revival, but nothing comparable to the Vietnamese success. 
 
                                                 
10   World Development Report 2993, table 3. Although such macro-data on agriculture are always subject to question, the 
picture that emerges is consistent with other observations of agriculture in the two countries. 
 
11    The point can be illustrated by a simple arithmetical example. If, in both countries, the national requirement for 
agricultural products was the equivalent of, say, $160 per agricultural worker, then the exportable surplus  would have 
increased from $19 to $29 in Tanzania and from $21 to $80 in Viet Nam – a difference between an increase of around 
50% and a four-fold growth. 
  
One possible hypothesis to explain the difference in performance relates to the contrast between 
highly intensive irrigated agriculture of Vietnam, and the more extensive, rain-fed agriculture of 
Tanzania.  
 
Historically, the dominant economic activity in the Vietnamese countryside was paddy 
production. Rice is by far the most important food crop, with rice paddy covering 74% of the 
cultivated area. Paddy production accounted for some 45% of the Gross Value of Agricultural 
Product in 1992. As a result of increases in multiple cropping and of productivity growth, rice 
production has more than doubled since 1980. Over a period of 10 years, 1987-97, average yield 
increased from 2.7 tons/ha to 3.8.
12 
Cropped land per capita is low (0.10 hectares per person, compared with 0.21 in India and 0.37 
in Thailand - but more than Bangladesh with 0.08 hectares per capita).
13 The ratio of cultivatable 
agriculture land is amongst the lowest of all developing Asian economies. Despite this 
constraint, Vietnam has emerged as a leading agricultural exporter, and has made considerable 
progress in diversifying agriculture exports in recent years. By comparison, Tanzania has 0.17 
hectares per person, but little large-scale irrigation. A rough calculation from World 
Development Indicators data suggests that by the end of the 1990’s the value of agricultural 
output per hectare of arable land was of the order of 2.3 higher in Vietnam than Tanzania.
14  
 
Vietnam has increased rice production by about million tonnes of rice each year, turning it from 
a food-deficient country and importer of around 0.5-1 million tonnes a year in the pre-reform 
period to be an exporter of 3-3.5 million tonnes of rice a year. It has also become a large exporter 
of coffee, rubber, cashew nut, tea, pepper, and fish-farming products, as well as developing a 
range of products for the domestic market, such as maize, cotton, soy bean, sugar cane and dairy, 
allowing the country to save hard currency for other purposes that would have been need for 
food imports. 
 
                                                 
12   Average annual yield figures cover wide regional differences, e.g. in 1992 ranging, from 2.4 in the Central Highlands and 
4.0 tonnes per hectare in the Red River Delta (1992). Variations between provinces are even greater, ranging from 1.5 
to 5.0 tonnes per hectare.  
13   Based on data from the early 1990’s. 
 
14   Based on data on value of agricultural value added per agricultural worker (1998-2000) and people per square mile of 
arable land (2000).  
A comprehensive analysis of the sources of agricultural growth in Viet Nam is still awaited, and 
indeed for many knowledgeable commentators the success has been a surprise (one view current 
in the early nineties was that the first burst of growth was a response to liberalisation that would 
run out of steam very soon).  
 
Some positive characteristics Vietnam shares with Tanzania, including a fairly egalitarian system 
of land-holding which provides access to land for most rural households. Beginning with reforms 
in the early 1980’s, the use of market instruments to co-ordinate and provide incentives to farm 
households stimulated growth in both countries – efficient, functioning markets are especially 
important as an economic co-ordinating mechanism for small-holder agriculture – but it is 
difficult to judge which country has more efficient rural markets. 
 
Where Viet Nam has a clear edge is in the effective public provision of basic infrastructure 
servicing agriculture (notably water and transport). Likewise, the continued functioning of 
organisations responsible for research and distribution of farm inputs (by a mix of private and 
public enterprise) underpinned productivity growth - the support system is probably sub-optimal 
but nevertheless is capable of handling some key developmental tasks, and in general performs at 
a much higher level than the Tanzanian system.  
 
On the other hand, Vietnamese agriculture is not more mechanised to any great extent. The big 
difference is irrigation. The importance of irrigation is not only its immediate effect on 
productivity but its indirect effect in reducing the risks of innovation and high input use 
techniques.    
 
The contrast between the irrigated agriculture of many Asian countries and the rain-fed 
agriculture of much of Africa is quite profound, having important social as well as agricultural 
consequences – typically in much of Asia the more developed areas are the lowlands, with less 
developed areas (populated by “ethnic minorities” or “hill tribes”) in the highland areas. In 
Eastern Africa the reverse holds, the highlands being the more developed areas. 
  
It should be noted, however, that innovation and progress in Tanzanian agriculture may be 
greater than is suggested by the mediocre performance in agricultural exports. Sustained high 
rates of growth of paddy production are changing the composition of Tanzanian food supply 
significantly, and there has been substantial innovation in horticulture and fruit production, 
resulting in a thriving rural-urban trade and fast-growing but incompletely recorded exports to 
regional markets. However, much of this change appears to have been spontaneous. Official 
efforts to sponsor productivity improvement (e.g. through many World Bank projects) have had 
little apparent impact. 
 
Another area where Viet Nam might have an edge is in relation to rural-rural migration. Fluid 
population movement in rural areas has been conducive both to growth and poverty alleviation – 
e.g. the encouragement of migration and investment to open up new areas for tree crop 
production. 
 
Thus a key factor explaining the difference in performance is Vietnam’s agricultural success in 
expanding and diversifying production that has resulted both in low-cost food supply and strong 
expansion in production of agricultural exports.  
 
Agricultural development in Vietnam has combined household farming with concentrated areas 
of larger-scale specialized production. Key supporting policies have included land tenure reform 
(the development of long-term and stable land use rights), high priority for investment in 
maintenance and extension of the irrigation system, the strengthening of the research capacity 
feeding into an extension system that transfers new technologies (particular new seeds and 
breeds) to smallholders, and infrastructure investment which has opened up new areas for the 
expansion of export crop production. While improvements are still needed there has also been 
progress in reforming agricultural marketing and strengthening processing. The next steps in 
agricultural development seek to promote greater efficiency and quality improvements to 
increase competitiveness domestic and international markets.  
  
Dramatic crop growth and diversification in Vietnam contrasts to the much smaller changes in 
the composition of agricultural output in Tanzania. After two decades of reform, there has been  
no dramatic increase in the supply of food stapes, available data suggesting that staple food 
production remains more or less at around 7 million tonnes. Given dependence on rain-fed 
agriculture in poor production years Tanzania still has to import substantial quantities of food - 
in 2003 domestic food supply was expected to meet only 90 percent of the country’s 
requirements, leaving a deficit of ten percent to be bridged through importation, including 
350,000 tonnes of maize, 223,000 tonnes of wheat, 167,500 tonnes of rice, and the Government 
has had to set aside shs. 8.0 billion to be allocated for emergency relief (QER, April-June, 2003, 
p.1-2). On a more positive note, however, there has been some success in diversification into 
horticultural products and fruits.  
 
Table 3:  Food Production (Million tonnes) 
  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002
(a)  2003
(b) 
Total food production: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
11.4 
 
14.4 
 
18.2 
 
19.9 
 
26.1 
7.4
(c) 
34.5 
7.7 
34.3 
7.4 
35.8 
7.82 
 
Main crop: 
Vietnam (Paddy) 
Tanzania (cereals) 
10.3 11.6 15.8 19.2  24.9 
3.7
(d) 
32.5 
3.7 
32.1 33.6 
4.02 
34.6 
a) Estimated. 
b) Projected. 
c) 1997.  
d) 1998. 
Sources: Vietnam’s General Department of Statistics; VER, March 2001, p.41, Jan. 2003, p.41, August 
2003, p.28; QER, Tanzania,  Jan.-Mar.2001, p.8, Oct.-Dec., 2001, pp.1. 
 
4.2   The Industrial Sector and State Enterprise  
 
A critical difference between Vietnam and Tanzania has been the differing performances of their 
industrial sectors. Despite some transitional difficulties, in Vietnam industrial output increased at 
a lively rate throughout the reform period and, of particular importance, has made a significant 
contribution to Vietnam’s buoyant export performance. By contrast, in Tanzania reform has not 
yet generated any revival in industrial output, and Tanzania has yet to produce significant 
industrial exports.  
 
This difference in performance may be attributed both to differences in the pre-reform period and 
differing reform strategies. Whereas Vietnam’s pre-reform industrialisation efforts seem to have  
laid the foundation for sustained industrial growth, the bulk of the industrial investments made 
by Tanzania made little sustained contribution to economic growth. 
 
Part of the difference in the pre-reform period reflects the human development factor. In 
retrospect, the Tanzanian industrialisation in the 1970’s can be seen as involving a naïve “turn-
key” project approach, under which, often with donor support, it was assumed that the building 
of factories would itself be sufficient to generate industrial growth. Too little attention was given 
to the requirements of management or technical capacity.
15  
 
In the pre-reform period, both countries used State Enterprise as the chosen vehicle for industrial 
development. However, the difference in performance in the state enterprise sectors suggests that 
using the term “state enterprises” as though it describes a fairly homogeneous reality throughout 
the ex-communist and developing world can be highly misleading.  
 
Although the efficiency of the Vietnamese SOE sector has been subject to searching criticism, as 
it is seen to have used a disproportionate share of scarce capital and foreign exchange resources, 
nevertheless important segments produced successfully and have survived. For those who 
believe in the general principle that SOE’s cannot perform, one of the paradoxes of 
contemporary Vietnamese development is the apparent success of significant numbers of State 
enterprise in adapting to the market, entering into joint ventures with foreign investors, changing 
their output mix, exporting successfully, etc.  
 
In the late 1980’s, before the onset of aggressive reform, it was evident that the Vietnamese 
model of SOE had its own characteristics. In Vietnam's decentralized system, many State 
enterprises competed with each other, having significant autonomy in practice, being owned by 
many different agencies of the State - all adding up to a social form which was certainly not 
private capital, but equally in important respects did not conform to the image of a Soviet (or 
Tanzanian) monopolistic State enterprise.  
                                                 
15   Examples of the failures of this approach are many, the most extreme case being the ill-fated, World Bank funded 
Morogoro shoe factory. An interesting contrast in outcomes, which deserves a systematic comparative case study, 
relates to the two large Swedish funded paper projects. Neither were well-conceived or designed, but in the event the 
Viet Nam project produces paper whereas the Tanzanian project does not.   
 
The rather chaotic organisation of Vietnamese State owned business in the pre-reform period 
could have been seen as a failure of planning (because of the gap between stated goals and 
performance), but subsequently it has appeared as a merit.  There was a high degree of economic 
autonomy exercised by the various political levels below the central government and the system 
also accommodated a remarkable diversity of behaviour by publicly owned enterprises, 
providing opportunities for genuine entrepreneurship at the early stages of the reform process, 
particularly at the provincial and more local levels. The high degree of provincial and State 
enterprise autonomy (rather surprising in a supposedly centralized regime) had partly resulted from 
the strategic requirements of a long war, including the need to decentralise capacity in the face of 
bombing and the logic of conducting guerrilla warfare. The upshot was that the manager of a State 
enterprise often had freedom of manoeuvre, and the potential to reap benefits from successful 
performance. 
 
The provinces always seem to have gone their own way to some degree in managing the 
enterprises they "owned" (and no doubt that was also true of the Army) and the incidence of 
open inflation during the Central Planning period suggests that the price control system was a 
good deal less effective than in Eastern Europe. 
 
During the reform period, SOEs have continued to play an important role as part of the “multi-
sectoral economy”, through which the government seeks to mobilize all segments of society to 
achieve high rates of development. Through this policy, both SOEs and private firms are 
welcome, though the State sector is assigned the leading role. This “leading role” confirms the 
continuing importance of the SOEs in the Vietnamese economy.  This contrast sharply with 
Tanzania, where a process of dismantling and privatising parastatals has resulted in the private 
sector becoming dominant in the Tanzanian economy.  
 
In Vietnam, the SOEs have undergone dramatic reforms, but have not subject been to 
comprehensive privatisation, which was seen to have potential negative results, such as the loss 
of State property and the impoverishment of the workers, which it was feared would result in 
social disturbance. The private sector is still weak in Vietnam (as indeed it is in Tanzania), so  
that it was feared that down-playing the role of the State sector would lead to the reduction in the 
momentum of growth.  
 
The reform of SOEs in Vietnam has been carried out through various means, including 
reorganisation (reducing the number of enterprises substantially), equitisation
16, and the selling 
and lease of some assets. SOEs have been encouraged to participate in joint ventures with 
foreign investors. Efforts have also been made to introduce greater financial discipline. The 
abolition of direct subsidies and the end of price controls fairly rapidly exposed State enterprises 
to much greater competition. While there are still problems of loss-making and inefficiency in 
many State enterprises, reforms have worked to improve the efficiency of the operations of many 
enterprises.  
 
The number of SOEs was dramatically reduced with the first sharp drop from 12,000 to 5,000 in 
2002. Since then reduction has been slower and is expected to result in around 3,000 firms by 
2005.  
 
Among these SOEs roughly 30 percent have adapted well to the market economy and make 
profits, 40 percent break-even and 30 percent make losses.  
 
Over 90 percent of FDI’s joint ventures have been between Vietnam’s SOEs and foreign 
companies, which has creat5ed new industries and helped existing industries to improve 
productivity and to access new markets and technology.  
 
By comparison, Tanzania has conducted a much faster reform of SOEs, mostly through 
privatisation. In seven years, 330 out of 395 firms targeted for privatisation were divested – an 
average of more than one every ten days (The Express, August 2003, Special Copy for SADC 
Summit 2003).  
 
                                                 
16  Equitisation involves a change in legal form, with the introduction of share-ownership, but not necessarily an immediate 
substantial transfer of share ownership to private owners.  
In Vietnam the reform of large SOEs, particularly those in the areas of infrastructure and public 
goods, has been very cautious – in practice none of the big industrial firms or public utilities 
have been privatised. In Tanzania SOEs have been privatised in all sectors. Even TANESCO, the 
national electric power company, has been placed under a two year management contract by a 
foreign company for two years and is being prepared for privatisation in the coming three years. 
 
Although Tanzania did not have an effective centralized command economy, neither did it 
encourage initiative by State Enterprise managers. The management system could be described 
as one centralized bureaucratic inertia, neither rewarding success nor punishing failure.  
 
There may also be more intangible, social factors affecting the supply of entrepreneurship, with 
greater latent potential in Vietnam for commercial entrepreneurship, once opportunities became 
available and a lively commercial response of management which transformed segments of the 
publicly owned sectors.
17 The reform process therefore had a strong spontaneous element, with 
fledgling entrepreneurs taking the initiative ahead of policy changes. By contrast, In Tanzania 
while there is good supply of entrepreneurial initiative in the small-scale, informal sector, larger 
scale entrepreneurship remains the province of the minority communities. 
 
Thus in the reform period, after an initial slow start Tanzania has vigorously embraced 
privatization, whereas it is in the area of enterprise policy that the Vietnamese authorities have 
been mostly persistently subject to criticism. Ownership reform has been slow. However, so far 
this has not acted as a drag on growth in the way predicted by external commentators. While it is 
not difficult to come across horror stories of inefficiency, there are also many examples of 
successful joint ventures and productive contributions made by the sector. 
 
This may be because of the competitive environment faced by many State Enterprises and a 
degree of decentralisation that permits innovation by State Enterprise managers. This suggests 
that a competitive environment may be a more important factor in determining performance than 
the nature of ownership – an outcome more consistent with the Lange-Lerner model of 
                                                 
17   See Entrepreneurship in Vietnam: transformation and dynamics, edited by Per Ronnas and Bhargavi Ramamurthy, 
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (2001) for an excellent empirical study of Vietnamese entrepreneurial vitality.  
combining decentralised public ownership with efficient allocation than with Kornai’s view that 
the soft budget constraint, and its deplorable consequences for efficiency, is the virtual inevitable 
outcome of widespread public ownership. 
 
One response of critics to this evidence of successful growth despite the slowness of enterprise 
reform is that on the one hand growth would have been even faster with more conducive policies 
and that in the harsher international business climate following the 1997 regional crisis failure to 
reform more vigorously will hold up future development. 
 
An alternative explanation, that is not very helpful to those looking for transferable lessons, is 
that if the “animal spirits” of business enterprise are sufficiently lively, the policy environment 
may not be of primary importance (aggressive entrepreneurs, public and private, domestic and 
foreign, may be able to get round unhelpful regulations.) This is unhelpful, because from the 
point of view of the economic policy-maker the supply of entrepreneurship is largely exogenous.  
However, it certainly should give rise to a careful evaluation of underlying entrepreneurial 
capacities and opportunities when judging the potential efficacy of policies – there are surely 
countries that have implemented “open door” policies only to discover the lack of applicants to 
enter.  
 
In Viet Nam, while through much of the reform period, the design of the business regulatory 
environment was not conducive to private sector development; in practice the system 
accommodated vigorous private sector growth. No doubt the regulatory system has imposed 
hidden costs on private business, both in the pecuniary sense of the “envelopes” to be passed to 
officials, and in the transactions costs of handling bureaucracy. Also, ambiguities regarding the 
official attitudes towards private wealth have probably led some successful business people to be 
secretive. Nevertheless, the growth of the non-State sector has been lively, and the extent of 
informal business activity was evidenced by the rapid registration of businesses when procedures 
were simplified under the new (2001) business law.  
 
The emphasis on a continuing leading role for SOE’s has not discouraged the rapid growth of the 
private sector. The Vietnamese experience suggests the possibility of developing a lively private  
sector, through liberalisation, without resorting to significant privatisation, at least in the early 
reform stage. The vitality of the Vietnamese private sector was demonstrated when, after two 
years of implementing the Law on Enterprises, 55,000 new enterprises have been registered with 
the total registered capital of US$6.7 billion. The new law has provided a more stable 
environment for the growth of private business.  
 
One difficulty in drawing lessons is that the informal characteristics of the institutions and 
understanding of the economic “rules of the game” is quite as important as the formal 
institutions. Moreover, having a reasonably predictable political environment and civil order may 
be as important as appropriate legislation and legal systems.  
 
In the post-1997 setting, it was interesting to speculate whether the onset of hard times in the 
international economy would be taken as a spur to intensified reform in Viet Nam, or as a call for 
greater caution, especially in terms of external capital flows. On the one hand, it could be argued 
that faster reform was needed in an increasingly competitive environment to attract limited 
international investment. On the other hand, further and aggressive liberalisation might left the 
economy excessively exposed to the consequences of international economic instability (as a 
corollary, just as the slow pace of banking reform insulated the Vietnamese economy from some 
of the worst impacts of the post 1997 East Asian down-turn). In the event, Vietnam weathered 
the post-1997 crisis quite well and it did not seem to have any great impact on the pace of 
reform. 
 
In pursuing the comparison between the two countries, the contrast in experience suggests the 
question of whether there was an alternative, preferable reform path to the rather doctrinaire 
trade liberalisation, privatization policies implemented by the Tanzanian.
18 However, most of the 
Tanzanian parastatals were in such a sad shape by the late 1980’s, and a malaise of bureaucratic 
inertia so embedded, that a more nuanced or gradualist approach to enterprise reform might have 
been difficult to achieve. The result is that in the economy emerging from the reform process 
                                                 
18   Dr. Do Duc Dinh, deputy head of the Institute of World Economy, in Hanoi has been a visitor to the Economic and Social 
Research Foundation in Tanzania during 2002. He is a leading proponent of reform in Viet Nam, but has observed that 
in Tanzania privatization has been implemented more as a doctrine than as a judgment based on pragmatic 
assessment of the merits of each privatization.  
there is very little indigenous Tanzanian presence in the ownership, control or leadership of the 
industrial and large scale commercial sector. Meanwhile in Vietnam indigenous ownership, 
leadership and entrepreneurship are dominant factors in business.  
 
Table 4:   Vietnam’s GDP Shares by Ownership (%) 
Year/Ownership  Public  Non-Public
(a)  FDI 
1991 29.25  70.75  - 
1995 40.20  53.50  6.30 
2000
 (b) 39.00  47.7  13.30 
a) Non-public sectors include people’s businesses, cooperatives and mixed economies. 
b) Estimated. 
Source: Vietnam’s World Economic Problems, August 2000. 
 
4.3 Structural  Transformation 
 
The development of the two national economies may be addressed not only in terms of rates of 
economic growth achieved, but also in terms of the structural transformation required to sustain 
long-term development.  
 
In discussions of strategy in Vietnam two patterns of structural transformation have been 
addressed.  
 
The first was that one mostly discussed during the 1950s and 1960s, in line with thinking in the 
planned economies, in which structural change was seen as involving shifts between two sectors, 
i.e. agriculture to industry 
 
The modern and market-oriented concept of transformation recognises that economy included 
not only agriculture and industry, but also the service sector. With development, the share of the 
first sector will shrink, leaving space for the second and the third to expand.  
 
Applying both of these two patterns of structural transformation to the economies of Tanzania 
and Vietnam, it is evident that in the case of Tanzania the structure has remained almost the same 
during the reform period, with agriculture’s share slightly changed from 48.7% in 1987 to 47.5% 
in 2002, manufacturing from 8.9% in 1987 to 13.1% in 2002,, while in Vietnam though  
agriculture grew at a rate of 4.5% to 5% per year, higher than the rates of 3% to 4% a year in 
Tanzania, its share in GDP dropped nearly a half from 40.2% in 1986 to 23.6% in 2002, leaving 
space for the share of industry to expand from 27.4% to 38.3% and services from 32.4% to 40% 
in the same years. These facts illustrate the higher rate of structural shift towards industry in 
Vietnam, but also that this shift in shares is supported by a higher rate of agricultural growth – 
the Green Revolution supporting the Industrial Revolution,  
Table 5:  Structural Transformation (%) 
  1986  1990  2000  2001  2002  2005
(a) 
Industry: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania
(b) 
27.4 
8.9
(c) 
22.9 
8.8 
36.6 
7.5 
37.8 
- 
38.3 
13.1
(d) 
39 
- 
Agriculture: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
40.2 
48.7
(c) 
42.1 
47.9 
24.3 
45.1 
23.6 
48.0 
23.6 
47.5 
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(e) 
- 
Service: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
32.4 
- 
35.0 
- 
39.1 
- 
38.5 
- 
38.1 
- 
40 
- 
a) Estimated. 
b) Tanzania: Manufacturing. 
c) 1987. 
d) Besides, mining is of 15% and construction 11%. 
e) Projected. 
Sources: Vietnam’s 2001-2010 Socio-Economic Development Strategy, ND 21 April 2001; Vietnam’s 
Directions and Tasks of 2001-2005 Socio-Economic Development Plan, ND 22 April, 2001; VER, 
March 2003; QER Tanzania, April-June 2003; Samuel M. Wangwe, Brian Van Arkadie, 2000, Pp. 2, 8, 
29; Beatrice Kalinda Mkenda, 2002, Table 2.1, p. 6; The Guardian, Friday, 19 April 2002; George 
Kabelwa: South African FDI into East Africa: The case of Tanzania, ESRF Globalisation and East 
Africa Project, Dar es Salaam, 2002, p.  
 
 
5.0  THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
 
The lessons to be learnt from the experience of the two countries about the appropriate role of 
the State are not simple and are certainly subject to alternative interpretations. 
 
There were similarities. In both cases, the pre-reform planning system was quite ineffective even 
in its own terms. Despite the adoption of the vocabulary of Central Planning, neither Vietnamese 
nor the Tanzanian economy was ever effectively subjected to the disciplines of a centralized 
command economy. This meant in both cases that the response of the economy to market  
reforms was more rapid than in economies where there was a deeper experience of working 
central controls. 
 
Another shared feature of the Vietnamese and Tanzanian reform processes relates to the inter-
play between political and economic reform. While changes in economic policy were, no doubt, 
associated with shifts in political position and balance of forces within the two regimes, in both 
cases there was substantial continuity in the political system, processes of profound change in 
economic life being introduced and managed by an ongoing political regime.  
 
In the case of Tanzania, there was more apparent political change, as the transition in political 
leadership with the retirement of President Nyerere in 1985 shifted the ideological tone and 
political style of the regime of CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi – the Party of Revolution), and the 
subsequent shift to multi-party politics involved a more apparent change in political regime than 
anything seen in Vietnam.  Nevertheless, CCM has continued to play a hegemonic role in 
Tanzanian politics, and there have been significant continuities in the political leadership. 
 
The comparative success of reform in the two cases might be taken as evidence that, far from 
political change being a prerequisite of economic reform, economic reform may be more readily 
implemented under conditions of political continuity, if the regime is willing to espouse reform. 
 
The stability and continuity of the two regimes reflect their national legitimacy. CCM emerged 
from TANU (The Tanganyika African National Union), the unchallenged independence 
movement – the creation of the one party state had been a de jure recognition of a de facto 
reality. The communist movement in Vietnam was also a national independence movement, 
which meant that to be nationalist was not to be anti-party. 
The way the Communist system developed in Viet Nam was quite distinctive. Although the 
formal structure of the Communist Party and the leading role it is assigned constitutionally can 
be seen as applying a Soviet blue-print, the way the system worked in practice reflected a 
process of endogenous, organic growth which was built up during three decades of rather special 
political and military struggle. The system of decision-making through consensus building and 
balancing interests (e.g. regional and organisational – party, army and State) has sometimes  
delayed change, but by the same token reforms have been built on a pragmatic response to 
problems and, in terms of contemporary jargon, have been nationally “owned”.  
 
This is a far from trivial point, because if building consensus is accepted as normal, then there 
have to be significant differences of view accepted as a normal part of the political life, so that 
the system can be interpreted as operating on the basis of some sort of pluralism, or the tolerance 
of a multiplicity of views.. 
 
Although on occasions when faced with crisis, the Vietnamese authorities have acted swiftly and 
decisively (as in the implementation of macroeconomic stabilization measures in 1989), the 
typical approach to economic reform has been cautious, emphasising learning by doing, (the 
Vietnamese term “step by step” approach encapsulates the underlying philosophy). The official 
approach has been pragmatic, formal reforms often accommodating informal change. 
 
As the process of policy formulation and consensus building is only partially public, it is 
characteristic of the Vietnamese reform process that decisive movements in policy are sometimes 
followed by periods of apparent inaction, which are interpreted by some outsiders as reflecting 
unwillingness to carry the process further, or worse as evidence of the victory of shadowy forces 
opposing change. And yet, in the event, when agreement is arrived at and change happens, it has 
often been decisive and in striking contrast to the expectations of pessimistic commentators.  
 
Such an approach can be contrasted with a more radical, “big bang” approach to reform. While 
radical, revolutionary change may have virtues when it is the only way to sweep away vested 
interests and inappropriate institutions, there are also well-known dangers of attempting social 
engineering through the application of theoretical or utopian blue-prints.
19  
                                                 
19   These dangers were pointed out forcefully by the philosopher Karl Popper (e.g. in The Open Society and its enemies, 
1945) in a critique of left and right totalitarianism.  
Those who advocate the uncritical and immediate implementation of models of the market 
economy, based on abstract notions of the optimum, may have more in common with doctrinaire 
approaches to social engineering than with the more gradual, experimental and pragmatic 
processes of institutional development that have typically characterized the historical 
development of market economies.  
 
The historical paradox is that while periods of revolutionary change have often been the prelude 
to the successful development of market economies, following the revolutionary period the 
successful development of market institutions demands a more pragmatic, gradual approach. 
 
While some similar features can be observed in the culture and practice of the CCM, the party 
benefited and suffered from the crucial role played by Nyerere, even in the decade following his 
retirement. Nyerere had given the country a distinctive political rhetoric and in the early 
successful years following the Arusha declaration, a sense of national coherence and pride. 
However, he was not adept at responding to economic crisis, and the regime did not succeed in 
fashioning its own reform program. Reform, when it came, therefore represented a defeat for the 
established ideology.  
 
Reform has been well-enough received in Tanzania, for its evident benefit in terms of economic 
revival, and some members of the technical elite have been enthusiastic in embracing a virtual 
laissez-faire vision of economic policy. However, although the CCM regime has remained firmly 
in place, and there is little sign of it being challenged yet by the fragmented opposition under the 
multi-party system, the retirement and death of Nyerere have left an ideological vacuum, 
indicative of the degree to which he had dominated political thinking for a generation. 
 
The pre-reform Vietnamese State has been described as a “weak state” in terms of its economic 
management capability by some commentators (e.g. Fforde and de Vylder), because of failures 
to effectively implement stated policy intentions during the pre-reform period. However, the 
measured nature, continuity and national ownership of the policy-making process are 
characteristics of a strong State.  
  
Tanzania was more obviously a severely weakened State. At the low-point of its economic 
difficulties (by 1983) its economic management capacity was eroded. The system became 
increasingly debilitated by over-reliance on ODA. It was not capable of the sort of decisive 
actions which enabled the Vietnamese to regain control of their macroeconomic situation in 
1989, in the absence of strong donor support.  In these terms, Vietnam clearly had a strong edge 
over Tanzania. 
Based on the Vietnamese experience, a balanced view is suggested about the appropriate degree 
of government intervention in the economy, Vietnam has combined a willingness to shift 
vigorously in the direction of using market policy instruments and establishing a fairly orthodox 
macroeconomic stance, at the same time as maintaining an active role of the State, not only 
actively investing its own resources in infrastructure and human resource development, but also 
retaining an active State Enterprise sector and providing strong planning and policy guidance 
regarding medium-term growth goals. Vietnam has replicated what could be seen as an East 
Asian model of the developmental state, which is both flexible in the use of market instruments, 
but pragmatic about the requirements for active State intervention when required to implement 
national development goals. 
 
By comparison, in Tanzania there has been a much more considerable withdrawal of government 
from the economy. Excessive dependence on ODA has meant that most government 
development projects are donor funded. There has been some government effort to identify 
longer term development goals (“vision”) and to respond to donor thinking by fashioning its own 
poverty reduction program (PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper), but it would be an 
exaggeration to claim that government has yet been able to re-assert control over its development 
program, or that there is much sign of capability to design and implement development programs 
independently from the donors. And because of the dependence on donor thinking, programs 
tend to respond to contemporary donor fashion, rather than national priorities. 
 
The Tanzanian economy has responded quite well to liberalisation, but even with the great 
emphasis on private sector development, there will be a need for more coherent and vigorous 
government investment programs in infrastructure and human resource development to maintain 
growth momentum. And the absence of developmental capacity may render it difficult for the  
government to respond creatively to demands for more indigenous involvement in the economy, 
which will almost certainly be one response to current patterns of development. 
 
This commentary is not about political goals or the merits of alternative political institutions. 
However, in recent years issues of “good governance” have played an important part in the 
development literature. Insofar as the governance agenda is about asserting a particular set of 
political values and promoting Western political institutions, it lies outside the economic policy 
issues that are the focus of this commentary. However, a particular view of governance is 
currently being promoted as an appropriate means of achieving economic development with 
equity.
20 What light does the experience of the two countries throw on the relationship between 
political institutions and growth with equity? 
 
Over the past fifteen years, Viet Nam has achieved a high growth rate and poverty reduction 
under the aegis of a one-party Communist state, suggesting that political liberalisation is not a 
necessary condition for successful economic reform or poverty alleviation. Indeed, the argument 
might even be taken one step further, with the counter-historical hypothesis that if abrupt 
political change had been attempted alongside the economic changes, instability and uncertainty 
could have reduced the growth potential. Some care is required in expressing the logic of this 
argument, because to argue that the particular institutions of the one-party Vietnamese state 
facilitated the economic transition is not to argue that a one-party political system is either a 
necessary or sufficient condition for successful development. Countries can and do achieve 
growth and poverty alleviation under one-party and multi-party systems, while other countries 
have failed to achieve growth using one or other option.  
 
The conclusion therefore is that although it is the understandable and normal stuff of politics to 
espouse one or other set of political values as desirable and to promote particular political 
institutions that reflect those values, it is highly questionable if any particular political model can 
be justified as a vehicle for economic growth. Experiences in East Asia in this regard are very 
mixed. 
                                                 
20   See for example making government work for poor people – building state capability UK Department of International 
Development, September 2001.   
 
In the case of Tanzania, the movement to a multi-party system responded to international (donor) 
expectations, but also reflected the view of Nyerere himself that the Tanzanian one-party State 
was becoming corrupt and decadent. He was even of the view that it would have been healthy for 
CCM to spend a period out of office, until he made the judgement that the likely alternatives at 
that time (1995) would have been disastrous. However, by the early-1980’s CCM seemed no 
longer capable of the initiative required to respond to the economic crisis. 
 
However, the costs and benefits of moving to multi-party politics are still not clear. An open 
press and the potential of electoral challenge act to constrain government behaviour. However, 
the need to fund party politics may itself be a source of corruption. Moreover, it may be some 
long time before there is a fully functioning multi-party system, in the sense of government 
shifting between parties at election-time, while the role of CCM as a mobilizing agency has 
diminished.      
Of course, terms such as “one-party” and “multi-party” each encompass a wide range of political 
practice, and it may be that the particular way political institutions are managed is as important 
as the apparent constitutional forms.  
 
In some respects, the way the Vietnamese state operates in practice has been adjusted from 
received doctrine and adapted to the Vietnamese conditions, the State has managed to combine a 
high degree of authority and legitimacy for national institutions, while accommodating a 
considerable degree of autonomy in practice at the local level (both in local government and in 
publicly owned businesses).  
 
The successful Vietnamese performance over the past decade in alleviating poverty is capable of 
alternative interpretations, which can lend support to varying approaches to poverty reduction 
strategies. 
 
One possible interpretation is that going for growth is an effective poverty alleviation strategy in 
countries starting with reasonably egalitarian institutions (e.g. land access). In a country with 
pervasive poverty, economic growth must be a necessary pre-condition to widespread poverty  
reduction, and at that stage of growth (Vietnam in the early 1990s) it did not make sense to divert 
resources from high growth potential investments to low potential investments on distributional 
grounds. To be sustainable, poverty alleviation should be about the development of productive 
capacity, rather than redistributive welfare measures. 
 
Market liberalisation, because it promoted high growth, also supported fast poverty alleviation. 
In particular, market reforms were a key input into the acceleration of agricultural growth, much 
of it based on the household farm, a critical factor in reducing rural poverty, while the fast 
growth of the small and medium sized enterprise generated widespread income opportunities. 
 
In Tanzania, a significantly lower growth rate has so far generated much less impressive poverty 
reduction, and recent data suggests a growing gap between urban dwellers, who have reaped the 
main benefits from reform in the past decade, and those in the countryside, who have faced 
stagnating per capita incomes. 
 
Some aspects of the market led growth strategy may create difficulties for poverty alleviation in 
the future. In Viet Nam, despite the improvements in rural incomes, the absolute gap between 
urban and rural incomes is widening persistently and substantially.  
 
 
6.0 CAPITAL  FORMATION 
 
What light does the comparative experience throw on the role of internal and external finances, 
or the role of capital formation, as one of the decisive factors determining the success or failure 
of reform?  
 
In Tanzania, the days of self-reliance (a slogan of the Arusha Declaration, 1967) are long since 
gone, and the current expectation is that public development projects will be funded from foreign 
aid, while foreign investment will be the main source of private capital formation. 
 
In Vietnam the idea of “enhancing internal forces” (phat huy noi luc) has been so repeatedly 
stressed that it even raised scepticism among a number of people, particularly not a few foreign  
investors, donors and analysts. But the record indicates that Vietnam has in practice had a much 
greater reliance on the national (including overseas Vietnamese) contribution to capital 
formation than has been the case in Tanzania.  
 
The assessment of the role of foreign aid, private foreign investment, foreign trade, domestic 
savings and other sources of finance will help clarify the difference in perceptions and results 
achieved in Tanzania and Vietnam.  
 
6.1   The Role of Foreign Aid  
 
Foreign official development assistance played little role in the acceleration of growth in 
Vietnam. In fact, the period in which reform was initiated with particular vigour and the 
acceleration in growth began was characterised by sharp declines in external assistance, as 
support from the CMEA countries collapsed and was not yet replaced by flows from DAC 
members. Indeed, the subsequent growth in foreign assistance flows coincided with a slackening 
of the growth rate (although a causal relationship is not be to inferred, as that also saw the onset 
of the East Asian economic crisis).  
 
A plausible case has been made that technical assistance provided an important input into the 
reform process. However, this was not associated with aid conditionality and therefore did not 
erode national ownership of policies. 
 
On the other hand, donors have played a very active role in Tanzanian policy-making, public 
finance and development spending throughout the pre-reform and reform periods. The 
comparison does not say a lot for the positive impact of ODA.  
 
It is now recognised that for policies to be effectively implemented they need to be “nationally 
owned”. This requires more than a formal approval of documents by political authorities. It 
implies that policies emerge from a national process of decision-making that is embedded in an 
authoritative set of national political institutions. This is necessary to ensure that policies are  
embedded in local realities and to create the commitment to implement and persist with policies 
over the longer-term. 
 
One by-product of the nature of the Vietnamese governmental system was that the policy process 
remained under national control. At the critical period (1989-94), access to external financial 
assistance was minor, so that any external advice that was sought was judged on its merits rather 
than being accepted grudgingly as a means of unlocking donor coffers. The national ownership 
of policy was unequivocal. When donor conditionality emerged as a factor in the policy-making 
process it was not very effective in accelerating reform. The Vietnamese have managed the 
donors rather well so far.  
 
This contrasts with Tanzania, where the failure to craft an effective national response to 
economic crisis in the period 1978-84 and the excessive degree of aid dependence resulted in a 
donor-led policy-making process. 
 
In the case of Vietnam, policies emerged from its characteristic political process.  Sometimes this 
involves time consuming consensus building and consultation with key interests in the 
Vietnamese political system.  All the major reforms that have been adopted have been subject to 
that process, and when adopted have carried authority and legitimacy in terms of the established 
political system. Moreover, while the Vietnamese have been willing to listen to external advice 
and have been keen to study external experiences, they have not been willing simply to 
implement externally designed policy packages, so that it can be reasonably claimed that the 
policies adopted have been “home grown”. 
 
Much of the donor debate about policy in Vietnam revolves around the willingness or 
unwillingness of the Vietnamese authorities to implement external advice. However, a degree of 
caution in implementing external advice is eminently sensible, because such advice is quite often 
wrong, in Vietnam and elsewhere. 
  
There are a number of reasons why this is often the case
21. One is that visiting missions, the 
purveyors of advice, often have too little time (and some times too little interest) to understand 
local conditions and too readily conclude that local arrangements are inferior. Indeed, as 
consultants are paid to propose innovations, it is not surprising if advisory reports advocate 
changes irrespective of their objective merits.  And what is even worse, advisory missions often 
advocate institutions merely because they are familiar to the visiting experts, without noting the 
range of plausible options available.
22 
 
External commentators are also sometimes slow to recognise that in some areas even if reform is 
urgently required, it may be difficult to craft viable reform packages. In this respect it is striking 
that the apparent inertia in reforming the banking system and public administration in Viet Nam 
is in line with international experience and reflects basic realities that make reforms in those two 
areas particularly difficult to implement. 
 
Another difficulty arises from the rather foolish susceptibility of the donor community to global 
shifts in fashion in relation to such issues as structural adjustment, poverty alleviation, 
governance, decentralisation, gender, Comprehensive Development Frameworks, etc. As such 
shifts typically reflect the changes in the political influences that come to bear on aid policy in 
the developed countries, or changes in the leadership of key donor agencies, it is unlikely that 
such fashions will be particularly well adapted to the needs of any particular developing country.  
 
Indeed, as developing countries vary in so many respects crucial for the choice of appropriate 
policies, it must certainly be the case that general policy prescriptions are unlikely to be as 
universally applicable as frequently implied by donor-sponsored advice.   
 
By now, many donors have recognised, at least in principle, that aid dependence in Tanzania 
went too far, and efforts are underway to restore a greater degree of Tanzanian control over its 
                                                 
21   Many years ago Dudley Seers wrote a piece on “Why visiting economists fail” which covered the same ground and led 
to the riposte, “Why failed economists visit”. 
22   One senior public health official noted that he has received three different advisory missions from different countries, all 
of which advocated big but very different institutional changes, in each case incorporating aspects of their own 
experience or ideology. In no case did the visiting missions seek to identify the positive aspects of the Vietnamese 
system, despite the fact that Vietnamese health statistics are relatively good by international comparative standards 
given Viet Nam’s per capital income level.  
development process, but it remains true that policy is strongly influenced by donors, 
dependence of foreign consultants and technical assistance is still excessive and virtually all 
government development projects are donor funded and designed, a contrast to the situation in 
Vietnam where a good deal of public investment is still funded from the national budget and 
budgetary priorities are still substantially controlled by the Vietnamese authorities. 
 
In Vietnam, there is no evidence that attempts to introduce pervasive conditionality
23, 
particularly by the Bretton Woods institutions, has accelerated or improved the reform process. 
Vietnam has benefited from “national ownership” of the reform process and from a high degree 
of self-reliance at the critical moments in its development. Whether Vietnam will now suffer 
from its increasing use of ODA is a matter for speculation. Perhaps Vietnamese institutions are 
strong enough to withstand the process of infantilisation which typically results from donor 
attempts to control national policy-making processes. 
 
In fact ODA flows to Vietnam represent only a fraction of total foreign capital inflows, US$1.5 
billion of disbursed ODA compared to a total of US$24.7 billion foreign exchange availability in 
2002. To date, out of the total US$22 billion of ODA committed to Vietnam, US$11 billion has 
been disbursed. Vietnam’s total external debt was estimated roughly at US$15 billion in 2002 
compared to US$40 billion of GDP and $16 billion of export in the same year. Based on the 
criteria set by the World Bank, IMF and other international agencies, total foreign debt over 
GDP (TFD/GDP) of a country should not exceed 80%, and total foreign debt over export 
(TFD/EX) should not be higher than 220% of the country’s export, Even having been granted 
debt relief under the HIPC conditions, by the third quarter of the 2002/2003 fiscal year 
Tanzania’s external debt was still in the order of US$7,916.2 million, as much as 87% of 
Tanzania’s GDP – US$9,099.0 million and nearly 900% of US$902.5 million of Tanzania’s 
export in 2002 (Bank of Tanzania Economic Bulletin, Mar. 31, 2003). In these terms, Vietnam is 
clearly less vulnerable to international pressures than Tanzania. 
 
                                                 
 
23   The World Bank IDA Poverty Reduction Support Credit of $250 million, agreed in 2001, includes a Policy Matrix with 
over fifty policy actions to be implemented over the coming three years. Given the success of the Vietnamese without 
such support and policy conditionality, this sort of comprehensive donor guidance might seem gratuitous, if not arrogant. 
The explanation seems to lie in the internal process of the World Bank, where the management seems to require the 
purchase of a policy matrix commensurate with the size of a credit.     
The reason why Vietnam is less susceptible to donor influence can also be explained in part by 
the low level of donors’ funding in the Government budget (less than 20%), while in Tanzania 
after nearly two decades of reform, donors’ funding still covers nearly half (or 45%) of the 
Government budget (QER, April-June 2003, p.11). 
 
6.2  The Impact of Private Foreign Investment 
 
Private foreign investment is making an impact on growth in both countries. Because of the more 
vigorous privatization, the rapid growth in the mining sector and the active interest of South 
African capital, private foreign investment is now playing a leading role in Tanzanian economic 
growth.  
 
In Vietnam, private foreign direct investment has played a useful role mainly in two ways. 
Foreign investment, particularly from other economies in the region, was important in promoting 
the fast growth in labour intensive industrial exports, something which has not yet happened in 
Tanzania.  
 
In Vietnam, foreign investment was also important in providing know-how and finance for the 
fast growth in energy exports – but with the State Enterprise still playing an important role 
(unlike in Tanzania, where large-scale gold mining is entirely a matter for foreign business).  
 
The impact of foreign investment in real estate development in Vietnam was more ambiguous, as 
it stimulated a property boom which led to severe excess capacity in some areas (notably hotels). 
Also investment in import substitution industries led to high cost, excess capacity in some 
industries (e.g. car assembly), although that was not important enough to undermine overall 
industrial performance. 
 
The limited development of financial and equity markets has meant that foreign portfolio 
investment has been insignificant so far in both cases. While that may have limited access to 
external funding, it also shielded the economies from speculative flows and limited the impact of 
the East Asian financial crisis in the case of Vietnam.  
  
To evaluate the impact of FDI, it is necessary to examine not only the size of the flow, but also 
the nature of the contribution of FDI to the development of the economy, particularly in the 
transfer of technology and building of industrial capacity. In these areas there are obvious 
differences between Tanzania and Vietnam. In Tanzania FDI has increased at a faster pace than 
that of Vietnam but from a lower base, growing over ten times over 10 years, from US$47 
million in 1990 to US$767 million in 2000, while in Vietnam it grew only by 3 times, from 
US$839 million to US$2,400 million in the same period. However, the nature and contribution 
of FDI differed, FDI in Vietnam having so far had a more positive impact than in Tanzania.  
 
In Vietnam most of FDI have been in new investments through joint ventures with Vietnamese 
firms (80% of projects), and the largest part of it has been in manufacturing. In Tanzania many 
FDI projects have been to cover the divestiture of privatised SOEs, funding a change of 
ownership rather than the setting-up of new capacity, while new investments have concentrated 
mainly in the mining sector, not in manufacturing.  
 
Nearly half of the total FDI registered (licensed) capital of US$38.9 billion in Vietnam has been 
realised in actual investments, which have contributed to one eighth of the country’s GDP, one 
fifth of its total investment, a quarter of its export value and almost two fifth of its total industrial 
value. By comparison, FDI’s contribution to the development of Tanzania has been less clear. A 
number of privatised firms have performed well, contributing to ta revenues and growth in 
output, while others have contributed little. The most obvious impact of FDI on Tanzanian 
exports has come from mining investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6:  FDI (US$ millions / % of GDP) 
  1988  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002 
Committed: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania
(a) 
372 
 
839 
47.2 
7,309 
263.4 
2,400 
767.7 
2,500 
1,637.7 
1,400 
2,154.4 
Realized: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
60 150  2,743 2,200  2,300  2,100 
% of GDP
(b) 
Vietnam 
Tanzania
(a) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
6.3 
(c) 
- 
13.3 
7.9 
(d) 
  
a) Total foreign investment, of which FDI is usually made up of three/fourth. 
b) Actual FDI as % of GDP. 
c) 1994 was the first year FDI was separately calculated in Vietnam, and it was 6.41% of GDP. 
d) 1999. 
Source: Vietnam’s 2000 Economic Report, CIEM, March 2001; Vietnam’s World Economic Problems, August 
2000; Vietnam’s 2000 Economic Report, CIEM, March 2001; VER, June 2003, p.43; QER, Tanzania, 
Oct.-Dec. 2001, front page and p.14; Tanzania Investment Report, December, 2001. 
 
6.3  Comparative Aspect of Globalisation: Exports, Tourism, Remittances 
and Other Sources of Foreign Exchange 
 
The impact of globalisation is rarely unequivocally positive or negative. Countries that have the 
capacity and will to grasp the opportunities, to harvest the fruits and to minimize the negative 
impacts, can benefit from globalisation. The potential benefits are also strongly affected by 
geographical location in relation to the international economy. Available evidence suggests both 
that Vietnam has done better at grasping opportunities than Tanzania and has had advantages in 
terms of geographical locaction.. 
 
Both Tanzania and Vietnam are relatively small economies, and are therefore necessarily fairly 
trade dependent. Trade is one of the most important areas reflecting success in managing the 
open economy. In this area, Vietnam has been much more successful than Tanzania in expanding 
trade.  Vietnam’s total value of foreign trade of US$36.4 billion in 2002 is almost equal to its 
GDP, while Tanzanian trade of over US$2 billion is just less than 30% of its GDP. In the past 15 
years Vietnam has successfully integrated into regional and world markets, implementing 
commitments made within the framework of AFTA to reduce tariffs to 0-5% by 2006, gradually 
liberalizing the trade and investment regime within the framework of APEC, normalizing  
relations and signing the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States, signing trade 
agreements with EU, and initiating negotiations for WTO accession.  
 
While Tanzania has participate in the EAC, SADC and other regional arrangements, these have 
so far not had the sort of dynamic impact of regional trade agreements in Asia. This is not so 
much the result of differences in policy, as a result in difference in economic dynamism in the 
two regions. However, although Tanzania enjoys more preferential access to US and EU markets 
than Vietnam, it has not succeeded in exploiting trading opportunities in a similar fashion to the 
exporting successes of Vietnam. Vietnam has been able to grasp the opportunities of the regional 
and world markets to expand exports of both agricultural and industrial products, including rice, 
oil, marine products, garments shoes and textiles, coffee, tea, rubber, cashew nuts, electronics 
and others. The success of Vietnam in quickly grasping market opportunities was illustrated 
following the implementation of the Vietnam - US Bilateral Trade Agreement, with Vietnam’s 
exports to the United States doubling every year since the Agreement was finalized, increasing 
from less than half a billion USD in 2000 to an expected volume of US$2 billion this year 
(2003). By comparison, even when the US market was opened to Tanzania on a preferential 
basis through AGOA there was little response due to the lack of national export capacity. These 
weaknesses have limited Tanzanian gains from globalisation. The lack of responsiveness of the 
Tanzanian economy to international markets has left the economy vulnerable to negative 
movements in the terms of trade, and deterioration in markets for Tanzania’s traditional exports 
such as cotton, tea, coffee and cashew nuts (in the last two cases partly resulting from the rapid 
expansion of Vietnamese exports). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7:  Foreign Trade (US$ billions) 
Value/Year  1981  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001
(a)  2002
(a) 
Total: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
1.7 
 
2.1 4.3  13.6  29.5  31.2 
 
36.4 
 
Export: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
0.4 
 
0.6 
 
1.8 
 
5.4 
0.588
(b) 
14.3 
0.663 
15.0 
0.776 
16.7 
0.902 
Import: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
1.4 1.6 2.5  8.2 
1.382
(b) 
15.2 
1.367 
16.2 
1.560 
19.7 
1.511 
Balance: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
-1.0 -1.0 -0.7  -2.7 
-0.793
(b) 
-0.9 
-0.704 
-1.2 
-0.715 
-3.0 
-0.715 
a) Estimated. 
b) 1998. 
Source: Vietnam’s Ministry of Trade; General Department of Statistics; Vietnam’s 2000 Economic Report, 
CIEM, March 2001, pp. 39-43; World Economic Problems, August 2000; VER, January and March 
2003; Bank of Tanzania Economic Bulletin, March 31, 2003. 
 
Beside trade, FDI and ODA, there are other opportunities for developing countries to take 
advantage of globalisation, providing they have the know-how. In Vietnam tourism and 
remittances have made important contributions. During the reform years Vietnam has developed 
tourism from half a billion USD in 1990 to US$1.5 billion in 2002, and has sent some 300,000 
workers and professionals to work abroad, mostly to Asian, African and Middle East countries 
who, in their turn, have sent back to the country about US$1.5 billion a year. Remittances of 
US$1.5 billion a year are also sent by the three million Overseas Vietnamese who stay mainly in 
North America, Europe and Australia, bringing total remittances to US$3 billion a year, nearly 
equal to the amount of realized FDI plus disbursed ODA (of the order of US$3.6 billion in 
2002). These earnings have contributed positively to the healthy balance of payment of the 
country, and helped Vietnam to minimize the impact of the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis on the 
economy.  
 
Tanzania has substantially benefited from tourism with its earnings increased over 6 times in ten 
years, from US$120 million in 1992 to US$750 million in 2002, compared to a total value of 
Tanzanian exports of US$902.5 million in the same year, an encouraging achievement that 
requires further promotion. However, it seems likely that differences in the structure of the  
tourist industry in the two countries results in more of the value added being reaped within the 
national economy in Vietnam than in Tanzania. 
 
Table 8:   Vietnam’s Foreign Capital Supplies and Demands (US$ billions) 
  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002 
SUPPLIES: 
Export 1.815  5.449  14.300  15.0  16.7 
FDI (a)  0.152  2.743  2.200  2.3  2.1 
ODA (b)  -  0.73  1.600  1.5  1.5 
Remittance (c,d)  0.50  1.00  2.95  3.0  3.2 
Tourism (d)  0.5  0.8  1.2  1.4  1.5 
TOTAL 2.967  10.722  22.250  23.2  25.0 
DEMANDS: 
Import 2.474  8.155  15.200  16.2  19.2 
Debt Service (d)  0  0.5  1.0  1.5  1.8 
TOTAL 2.474  8.655  16.200  17.7  20.0 
BALANCE (e)  0.493 2.067  6.050  5.5  4.0 
a) Realized FDI. 
b) Disbursed ODA. 
c) Remittances by Overseas Vietnamese and Vietnamese workers abroad (figures for 2000 were $1.7 and $1.25 
billions respectively) – Estimate. 
d) Estimated. 
e) Supply over Demand. 
Source: VER April 2001, p.13; Vietnam News 08 June 2001; Nhan Dan 13 Dec. 2000; and sources collected by 
the author. 
 
6.4 Domestic  Savings 
 
The last but very important issue to be discussed in this paper is the mobilisation of internal 
resources. Vietnam has been increasingly successful in this regard, with increases in household 
income and successes in private business ventures increasing the rate of private savings, while 
the State has continued to contribute to national saving, by ensuring that a significant proportion 
of public and State enterprise investment is nationally funded. In Tanzania there has been an 
improvement in private savings, but public investment has remained dependant on external 
funding. 
 
There are many factors contributing to the size and effective use of domestic savings, including 
the policy environment which influences the attractiveness of investment. One set of factors 
which influence willingness to save and make savings available for investment purposes is the 
development of the financial and banking system.   
 
In Vietnam, institutional change of the banking and financial system started from a single-tier 
State banking system, with few financial institutions, and required the development of a 
commercial banking system almost from scratch, and market reforms which affected its 
operation and management. Other key policies included the move to positive real interest rates 
with appropriate spreads between borrowing and lending rates, exchange rate liberalization and 
the gradual rationalisation of the corporate tax system. There is still a need for more progress in 
improving the operation of the State owned banking sector and developing new financial 
instruments and deepening the structure of financial intermediation. Given the very high rate of 
growth in the real economy, there is a continuing need to develop the financial system to 
accommodate the needs of an increasingly sophisticated economy.  
 
However, much has been achieved. The principle of real positive interest rate was implemented 
in 1992, deposit rates were liberalized in 1996, and lending rates were freed in June 2002. 
Exchange rates shifted from a fixed multiple rate system governed by administrative measures to 
a flexible and market-based regulated mechanism, and corporate tax rates have been gradually 
reduced from around 40% at the beginning of the reform to 32% few years ago and 28% in 2003. 
These measures contributed to the reduction in inflation, encouraged families to commit a larger 
part of their savings to deposit in the banks, to stimulate firms to borrow money to invest and to 
help reduce tax evasion. As a result, the inflation rates in Vietnam declined from over 800% by 
the mid of 1980s to 4% in 2002 and the savings rates increased from 15% of GDP in 1991 to 
34% in 2002. 
 
Tanzania has also had some success in reforming financial, banking and foreign exchange 
system, There has been considerable success in reducing inflation rates from around 35% by the 
beginning of the reform to 4.5% in 2002, and savings rates have increased very marginally from 
6.5% of Tanzania’s GDP in 1998 to 12.7% in 2002, but this remains a much less impressive 
improvement than that achieved in Vietnam. However, there are still weaknesses manifested in 
continuing negative real deposit rates, with nominal rates ranging from 2% to 3% against the 
inflation rates of 4% to 5% per annum, and with excessive spreads, as lending rates are 15% to  
16%. Negative real deposit rates combined with high lending rates inhibits the financial system 
from playing a fully effective role in financial intermediation.  
 
Table 9:  Inflation and Savings Rates (%) 
  1986  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003
(a) 
Inflation: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
875 
35
(b) 
67.1 12.7 
12.8
(c) 
-0.6 
5.9 
0.8 
5.2 
4 
4.5 
5 
4 
Savings: 
Vietnam 
Tanzania 
 15
(d) 27.1 
6.5
(c) 
27 
11.6 
33.7 
11.1 
34.0 
12.7 
35 
a) Projected. 
b) Estimated. 
c) 1998. 
d) 1991. 
Source: Vietnam’s General Department of Statistics; Vietnam’ s2001-2010 Socio-Economic Development 
Strategy, ND 21 April 2001; VER, March 2001, February 2002, March 2003, p.9; Vietnam’s 
Economic Studies, April 2001; QER Tanzania, April-June 2003; Bank of Tanzania Economic 
Bulletin, March 31, 2003. 
 
 
7.0 SOME  CONCLUSIONS 
At the Conference “Vietnam – Africa: Opportunities Cooperation and Development in the 21
st 
Century” held in Hanoi in May 2003 Vietnam’s Prime Minister Phan Van Khai commented that 
“In the last 16 years and more of carrying out economic, social and administrative reforms, 
Vietnam has recorded encouraging achievements. As compared to 1986, in 2002 Vietnam’s GDP 
grew by 2.9 times, export by 21 times, school enrolment by 1.4 times, higher education by 5 
times, and life expectancy increased from 65 to 68 years.” (Conference Proceedings, P.17).  
Compared to Vietnam, although Tanzania has achieved an economic growth of 4% to 5% per 
year, the country’s social problems, poverty, disease and low level of education have not been 
tackled through an effective strategy. Perhaps most depressing has been decline of life 
expectancy from 60 years at the height of the 1970s to 50.05 years in 1990, then 47.15 years in 
1998, and 49 years old currently (M. Pigato, 2001, p.16), mainly resulting from the HIV/Aids 
pandemic. 
Of course, lessons to be learnt from comparative historical experience of national policies and 
growth will always be somewhat tentative and speculative. In that spirit, the authors offer the 
following conclusions, the first three of which are fairly obvious and non-controversial, the last 
three points are possibly more contentions.   
1.  The comparison demonstrates the importance of sustained investment in human capital. 
Vietnam made such an effort over the long-term, even through periods of great difficulty, 
and this has paid off. Tanzania started from a very weak base at independence, and has 
made some progress, but this is still insufficient, both in terms of mass literacy and the 
development of managerial and technical cadres. 
2.  The experience of both countries has demonstrated the effectiveness of market-orientated 
reforms. 
3.  The comparison points up the crucial importance of technical progress in agriculture at 
the early stages of industrialisation. The great success in increasing Vietnamese 
agricultural productivity is in contrast with limited progress in this regard in Tanzania. 
The experience suggests that market based reforms contribute to agricultural progress, 
but are not sufficient – they need to be backed up with substantial public investment in 
rural infrastructure and a strong institutional framework to provide improved technology 
and services, involving a judicious mix of public and private initiatives.   
4.  In developing the economy, it is the Vietnamese view that industrialisation is a key factor 
(in Vietnamese terms an industrialisation-oriented structural transformation is a crucial 
need). However, the transformation of the economy from an agrarian base toward an 
industrial and service base requires the increase in agricultural productivity discussed in 
the previous paragraph. It also requires breakthroughs in export-led industrial growth. 
The Vietnamese emphasis on industrialisation contrasts with the Tanzanian de-emphasis 
on this issue during the reform period, in light of the failures of attempts to industrialise 
under the so-called “Basic Industrialisation Strategy” in the 1970’s and the fact that 
attention to industrialisation is no longer very fashionable in the international circles that 
tend to influence Tanzania policy.. Tanzanian policy-makers will need to re-visit this 
issue. 
5.  Internal capital mobilisation and expanding foreign exchange earnings are cornerstones 
of development. Without a high domestic savings rate and expanding foreign exchange 
earnings, the economy continues to be dependent on foreign assistance and 
underdevelopment persists. There is a need in Tanzania to give greater emphasis to 
domestic saving, export promotion and other forms of self-help mobilisation of resources  
and to confront the issue of foreign aid dependency to be able to grasp the opportunities 
of globalisation. 
6.  It has been evident that the particular mix of private and public initiative promoted in 
Vietnam (in Vietnamese terminology developing the multi-sectoral economy of Vietnam 
under “renovation” (“Doi Moi”)) has done better than the almost exclusively private-
ownership bias in Tanzania under reform, and the earlier State-owned bias in both 
countries during the pre-reform period. The multi-sector approach adopted in Vietnam 
has the clear advantages of maintaining the continuity of development, preserving 
available productive capacity and national management capabilities, while attracting 
additional resources through joint ventures and new business investments. When the 
private sector is weak, it is wrong to advise a country to virtually abandon its State sector 
– such advice destroys the leaking house at the very moment it needs maintenance and 
renovation.  
Tanzania has thoroughly dismantled the State-owned sector through privatisation, 
whereas in Vietnam under the “transformation process toward the market economy” the 
State sector has continued to play a very active role. Although Vietnamese economic 
policy shifted from being over-active and over-controlling it has continued to play a 
more active development role than in Tanzania, where the State has moved too far in the 
direction of passivity, retreating from an active role in development.  
However, for the multi-sectoral economy to work, it needs a policy environment that 
stimulates a positive performance from the State sector. To meet this requirement, in 
Vietnam the State has limited direct interventions into business activities of State 
enterprises, has tried to improve the efficiency of SOEs through equitisation (i.e. giving 
State enterprises considerable autonomy short of privatisation) and focused on 
management through laws, regulations and the macroeconomic tools of the market 
economy, encouraging enterprises to compete on an equal footing in response to market 
signals. Though Vietnamese SOEs face many problems, the fact that only 30% of the 
SOEs in Vietnam continue to make losses indicates the potential for SOEs to contribute 
to development in the multi-sectoral economy. 
In comparing the two economies, it is probably fair to say that Tanzania, after initial 
hesitancy, has adopted an almost doctrinaire commitment to thorough market reform and  
privatisation, while Vietnam has adopted a more nuanced, pragmatic approach. The 
utilization of the market mechanism in the management of the State has been defined as 
one of the three pillars on which the renovation in Vietnam has rested, but the second is 
defined as the development of the multi-sectoral economy (i.e. making active use of both 
State and private and household enterprise). The third pillar is the “proactive integration 
of the Vietnamese economy into the international economy characterized by 
multilateralisation and diversification”.  
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